Cyborgs and Śūnyatā by Mascharka, David
 Cyborgs and Śūnyatā 44 
David Mascharka earned a B.S. in Computer Science and Mathematics and B.A. in 
Philosophy from Drake University in the spring of 2017. After graduating, he be-
gan a position as a computer vision researcher at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. His 
philosophical interests are mainly at the intersection of computers and society; 
especially trust in machine systems, model interpretability, and problems in the 
philosophy of mind.  
Cyborgs and Śūnyatā 
David Mascharka 
N 
ishitani Keiji presents a view of technology in which 
the pursuit of technological advancement leads to 
the loss of the human. Andy Clark describes a view 
in which humans are evolutionarily designed for uti-
lizing tools and technology such that technology becomes a part 
of our humanity. Despite the apparent conflict (Nishitani critical 
of technology; Clark embracing technology), the philosophical 
positions of Nishitani and Clark can be embedded in a larger 
space in which each helps inform the other. Inside this space, it 
becomes possible to open conversation between technology, 
Buddhist emptiness, and nihility. 
 Nishitani's Religion and Nothingness pursues an explora-
tion of the Buddhist sense of emptiness from a religious and sci-
entific context. Nishitani focuses on the relationship between 
science and philosophy, as well as between science and religion, 
seeking to break down the idea that scientific issues can only be 
discussed from within the standpoint of science. His essay 
“Nihility and Śūnyatā,” especially, presents a discussion aimed 
at understanding how problems that arise from the pursuit of 
technological advance lead to nihilism, which can then only be 
solved by a turn to emptiness in the Buddhist sense. 
 
 Akitomi Katsuya draws heavily on this work in pursuit 
of a discussion aimed at determining how Nishitani's conception 
of emptiness could contribute back toward technology.1 I wish to 
pursue this goal further by presenting a concrete way in which 
the conception of emptiness allows for the discussion of technol-
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ogy, as well as a way in which current technological progress 
may help facilitate the discussion of emptiness. 
 I explore this viewpoint through the account Clark puts 
forward in Natural-Born Cyborgs, which examines the adaptation 
humans have toward the use of technology. His basic view, which 
I will expand on, is that technology becomes so well integrated 
into our lives that it becomes a part of ourselves. This serves to 
challenge Nishitani's conception of technology as presenting an 
issue for humanity and opens an avenue of exploration. 
 I present Nishitani's account of technology as a perversion 
of the laws of nature in Section I, while in Section II discussing 
how Nishitani sees the development of technology as leading to 
nihilism. In Section III I explore Nishitani's turn to emptiness in 
the Buddhist sense as an escape from this nihility. Section IV dis-
cusses Clark's viewpoint on technological integration into human 
life, while Section V explores a reconciliation between Clark's 
and Nishitani's view by exploring the ways they may contribute 
to each other. I then conclude with final thoughts on the issues 
presented. 
 
I. Technology and Mechanization 
 Understanding the relationship between humans and the 
laws of nature is crucial for understanding the problems Nishitani 
sees stemming from technology. Importantly, there are three 
ways that we see the laws of nature manifested. First, we see the 
laws of nature as they act upon objects. If I throw a crust of 
bread, I can see gravity acting upon it. Secondly, we see the laws 
of nature within living creatures as instinct. We watch a dog jump 
at the crust of bread we throw, the dog manifesting the laws of 
nature in its instincts. Finally, there is a refraction of the laws of 
nature through technology, which is where humans make a 
unique contribution. By using rationality to capture and under-
stand the laws of nature, we are able to build technology that uses 
these natural laws in order to impose our telos back on nature. 
This is the refraction through knowledge that Nishitani writes 
about.2 
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 This embodiment of the laws of nature in mechanical 
technology shows that “obedience to the laws directly implies 
freedom from their bondage.”3 Here we have the laws of nature 
in place as objective fact. Humans are able to understand the laws 
of nature through rationality. By understanding the laws of na-
ture, we are able to construct machines that utilize these laws to 
perform some task. In this way, we utilize the laws of nature to 
act upon nature. For example, understanding the laws of nature 
allows us to construct skyscrapers by utilizing bulldozers and 
cranes which act upon the world. In doing so, we impose our own 
order on nature by acting within the laws of nature. 
 At the very moment of freedom from the laws of nature, 
Nishitani sees a critical turn. The relationship that we enter with 
nature through technology is one that inverts itself. As humans 
build more technology, we become ever more reliant on this tech-
nology. Nishitani sees this as a process of inversion in which hu-
mans have used the laws of nature to control nature, but become 
so reliant on the tools we use to control nature that these tools 
control us. Thus the laws of nature control us yet again, through 
our technology. Additionally and more strikingly, the pursuit of 
technology results in a tendency toward “the mechanization of 
man, toward the loss of the human.”4 To restate this, as human-
kind attains an extreme freedom in controlling the laws of nature, 
we at once forfeit our human nature as we mechanize humanity.5 
 This is the crucial issue that Nishitani raises, so I empha-
size it again with another phrasing of the problem. The original 
relationship between humankind and nature is distorted and in-
deed perverted through technology. This is what people point to 
when they speak of man “being dragged along by the machines 
he himself has built,”6 or being slaves to our own technology. 
The original relationship we have with nature, in which obedi-
ence to its laws implies freedom from them, comes to an extreme 
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II. Technology and Nihility 
 As this mechanization happens, technology ransforms us 
from completely rational beings in pursuit of technological ad-
vancements into raw subjects in pursuit of our desires who utilize 
the technology we develop to whatever end. This mode of being, 
Nishitani writes, is instantiated in many forms depending on the 
depth of its adaptation as pure subject. It lies anywhere between a 
sort of proto-nihility, in which it is masked, to a full realization of 
the meaninglessness inherent in nature and recognition that the 
subject's pursuits have no ground. This is precisely how nihilism 
arises from the pursuit of technological advancements. 
 What happens here is “a fundamental intertwining of the 
mechanization of man and his transformation into a subject in 
pursuit of its desires, at the ground of which nihility has opened 
up as a sense of the meaninglessness of the whole business.”7 The 
common existentialist attempt, once nihilism is reached, is to use 
that nihilism as a foundation, embracing the meaninglessness as a 
creative space. Nishitani sees this “positive nihilism in existen-
tialism”8 as a step away from the mechanization of humankind. 
This is precisely an attempt to “climb out of the pit into which 
man is slipping through the perversion of his original relationship 
to nature.”9 However, Nishitani sees this attempt at escape impos-
sible, for it is only through this perversion that nihility comes to 
light. The pit of nihilism is a result of the mechanization of the 
human, and so we cannot step away from this mechanization by 
resting on nihility. That is, we cannot escape the mechanization 
of the human by embracing the result of our mechanization. 
 Nishitani further mentions that the mechanization of hu-
mankind also underlies the problem of an imbalance between the 
progress of science and human morality. He writes that this is not 
so much an imbalance as a movement in opposite directions,10 
citing nuclear weaponry as an example. The positive potential of 
nuclear energy captivated scientists, but once the possibility was 
realized, human morality had not caught up with the technologi-
cal advancement. This technology was then used to largely anni-
hilate entire cities. 
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 Nishitani summarizes that we have seen a tendency to-
ward “the mechanization of the inner life and social relationships 
of man on the one hand, and the transformation of man into a 
subject in pursuit of its desires on the other,”11 which is the ten-
dency toward the loss of the human. A reversal of this mode, an 
opposition to the tendency toward the loss of the human, lies in 
elevating “the standpoint of the personality or spirit of man.”12 
For Nishitani, “personality or spirit constitutes the core of what is 
genuinely human,”13 and so must be recaptured. 
 A critical turn back to the original relationship of human-
kind to the laws of nature, the standpoint in which subordination 
to the laws of nature is simultaneously an emancipation from 
them, is required, Nishitani writes.14 This is the only standpoint 
from which we can overcome the loss of the human that results 
from the perversion of our relationship with nature, which is 
caused by scientific advancement. 
 
III. A Turn Toward Emptiness 
 As stated earlier, Nishitani does not believe we can take a 
stand on the nihility we face at the root of our perverted relation-
ship with nature because it is only through this perversion that we 
come to face it. The necessary turn, he proposes, is to the Bud-
dhist conception of emptiness, śūnyatā. 
 Akitomi describes this well, stating that “when one seeks 
the possibility of freeing oneself of nihility and firmly actualizing 
it in its midst, nihility may turn, within oneself, into 
‘emptiness.’”15 This is necessary because nihility is seen only 
from the standpoint of consciousness, which is to say from the 
perspective of subject. As such, nihility is seen as object apart 
from self. But the manifestation of nihility at once present in the 
realization of meaninglessness at the root of our technological 
pursuit goes beyond the standpoint of consciousness and must 
become part of oneself. 
 To expand, nihility is seen as something outside of being. 
Nonetheless, we come to recognize that nihility lies at the bottom 
of our very being. But insofar as we see nihility only from the 
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perspective of conscious self, nihility “remains a relative nothing-
ness as nonbeing in contrast to being.”16 That is, we see nihility 
as other from the perspective of self-being and at once at the bot-
tom of this self-being. Even so, as a result of our perspective, we 
cannot reconcile self and nihility insofar as we recognize nihility 
only as the negation of being. 
 This irreconcilability is precisely the motivation for the 
shift to the conception of emptiness that śūnyatā presents. This 
emptiness is a true emptiness, an “absolute nothingness that trans-
cends the conflict between being and nothingness.”17 This sort of 
emptiness is “the point at which we become manifest in our own 
suchness as concrete human beings, as individuals with both body 
and personality.”18 That is, śūnyatā is a field within which our 
most immediate being is manifest; it is a true emptiness lacking 
duality. This emptiness is not the negation of anything, nor can it 
be negated. 
 Nishitani writes of a life-oriented axis through which we 
can view the world, with a viewpoint that develops from life and 
soul to the crucial spirit or personality: the standpoint of the hu-
man. In contrast, there is also a death-oriented axis, which seeks 
to reduce everything to material relationships at the disregard of 
any telos: the standpoint of science. Śūnyatā, however, allows us 
to grasp the true ‘suchness’ of ourselves; our true form in which 
we manifest life-sive-death, death-sive-life.19 This is a point at 
which life and death are not seen as contrasting, but in the nondu-
ality of emptiness are seen always together, bound up as they are 
in our existence. We can thus see everything as a “‘double expo-
sure’ of life and death, of being and nihility”20 in which both life 
and death are manifest in us. 
 It is in this stage, this embrace of śūnyatā, that we are able 
to reconcile materiality and personality. Whereas the traditional 
view has the material along one axis and personality along a com-
peting axis, making the attainment of both simultaneously an im-
possibility, this view of ourselves in our suchness reconciles these 
views as the embodiment of “being-sive-nothingness”21 and al-
lows for a standpoint reconciling personality and materiality. 
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 This view of being-sive-nothingness is possible only 
through the realization that being is being, nothingness is noth-
ingness, and emptiness is their true form. In this sense, being is 
nothingness and nothingness is being. At root, there is no differ-
ence whatsoever: both are true manifestations of emptiness. 
While we are ordinarily situated in being, a result of conscious-
ness, and thus view nothingness as the negation of being, empti-
ness puts forward a view in which being is not the negation of 
nothingness and nothingness of being. Rather, emptiness is the 
absolute negation, within which there is no duality. This is why 
nothingness is being and being is nothingness. 
 It is precisely here that Nishitani sees a solution to the 
problem presented above. Emptiness comprises a field in which 
both the abyss of nihility and the everyday existence of our being 
are manifest. In such a field, nihility can be reconciled with be-
ing. It is through this nonduality of emptiness that this takes 
place. Within consciousness, nihility is seen as an object existing 
apart from being; the negation of being. Within nihility, things 
cease to have representation and appear only in their own reality. 
At the recognition of nihility at the root of being, consciousness is 
thus broken through, and being becomes pure subjectivity. Empti-
ness comprises a field holding both nihility and being, such that 
both are seen as one. 
 This, then, is what is key to humanity. The nonduality of 
emptiness is crucial for Nishitani. He writes that “only the abso-
lute emptiness is the true no-ground (Ungrund).”22 Within empti-
ness, all things, including life and death, are seen in their 
“bottomless realities,” their “bottomless suchness.”23 Nihility 
alone cannot serve this purpose because it is always seen as a ne-
gation and so acts as a ground upon which the self ties itself.24 
Thus, only śūnyatā presents a true space of non-attachment within 
which we break through nihility to become truly human.25 
 
IV. Cyborgianism 
 Andy Clark's Natural-Born Cyborgs presents an account 
wherein humans are evolutionarily designed for utilizing tools 
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and technology. He presents the notion of transparent technolo-
gies which are those that are “so well fitted to, and integrated 
with, our own lives, biological capacities, and projects as to be-
come almost invisible in use.”26 For example, we may consider 
pen and paper transparent technologies. If I am asked to solve 
some multiplication problem, I will naturally reach for and utilize 
pen and paper to help me arrive at the answer. This sort of natural 
reach for the tools with no real thought about it is what makes 
them transparent: they are so easy to use as to be invisible in use. 
Rather than consciously thinking about the tools as being part of 
the process of arriving at an answer, I am able to ignore the tools 
and focus only on the multiplication algorithm. The tools used 
never come to mind and are thus transparent. This idea of readi-
ness-at-hand may also be in the work of Heidegger.27 
 This is precisely the idea that Clark is getting at with his 
notion of transparent technology. The fact that we are biological-
ly adept at making use of such technology is what makes us natu-
ral-born cyborgs. With this, a naturally-arising question comes to 
the fore: why do we say that technology is distinct from us, and 
not a part of our selves? Clark discusses a few conception of self 
including the idea that “I am the sum total of the parts I control 
directly”28 and the idea of a “narrative self”29 that we are intellec-
tual entities operating in concert with physical embodiment and 
with goals that persist over time. 
 In both of these conceptions of self, we are plastic entities 
that shift according to our physical abilities and reach. The addi-
tion of a mechanical arm that we are able to control quite natural-
ly after some time30 can be said to indeed be part of us. Clark's 
example is that of performance artist Stelarc, who attached a me-
chanical arm to his right arm and is able to control the third hand 
through electrodes attached to his abdomen. By contracting dif-
ferent abdominal muscles, Stelarc is able to operate this third 
hand. Stelarc is able to control this hand independently of his oth-
er two, write with it, use it in conjunction with his biological 
arms, and overall operate it as well as he can his biological arms. 
 Given that Stelarc uses this mechanical arm as fluently as 
his fleshy arms, and just as unconsciously, it seems natural to say 
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that the arm is indeed a part of Stelarc. Stelarc's embodiment is 
not only a biological system but a digital system integrated into a 
biological system. When we talk about ‘Stelarc’ we refer not just 
to his biological parts, but to the entire body-mechanical arm sys-
tem. Thus the mechanical arm is indeed a part of Stelarc. This 
holds true even for control and sensing across a distance. As Ste-
larc attaches a mechanical arm to his biological arm, so too can 
we imagine attaching an arm and camera to the wall and becom-
ing so natural in our use of the arm and camera that they become 
a part of ourselves. We are thus embodied in distinct locations of 
physical space. 
 To further illustrate this idea of transparent technology, let 
us consider an example. If a piece of information is  readily ac-
cessible (e.g. as easily as the time from a watch), it can be said 
that we know this information, even if it is retrieved through 
some digital mechanism.31 Suppose I have an implant in my brain 
that interfaces with the internet. If I am asked, “What is the capi-
tol of Iowa?” I will respond, “Des Moines,” with very little delay. 
This may be because this information is stored somewhere in my 
neural circuitry, or it may be because the implant retrieved that 
information and fed it to my brain. Regardless, there seems to be 
no difference in my ability to retrieve and utilize that information 
and so I can be said to know what the capitol of Iowa is. Current 
information streams from, say smartphones, are not yet so close 
at hand, but it is not unbelievable to imagine they soon will be. At 
such a point, it seems that the idea that technology is different 
from self breaks down. Rather than simply using technology, 




 Nishitani writes that in its original form, the relationship 
of humans to nature was characterized by our submission to the 
laws of nature implying a freedom from their bonds. The perver-
sion that takes place is the over-reliance on technology that we 
come to have. As technology embodies the laws of nature and 
operates strictly according to them, if we rely on technology to a 
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very high degree, nature takes on a more radical control over us 
than it did in its original form. 
 With Clark's account in place, we may begin to challenge 
Nishitani's conception of technology perverting our original rela-
tionship with the laws of nature. Just as nature manifests its laws 
through our own instincts and those of other animals, so too are 
the laws of nature manifested through technology which becomes 
a part of ourselves as we see in Clark's account. Thus we see that 
the problem Nishitani presents of our relationship with nature dis-
solves. Rather than being reliant on technology and thus radically 
controlled by nature, we become one with technology and so 
stand in the same relationship with nature we originally did. 
 Such a conception certainly requires a shift in perception, 
but one that is nonetheless conceivable at present. This sort of 
conception changes what it means to be human. At its root, how-
ever, such a view is not as radical as it may appear, even given 
Nishitani's reading. After all, the turn toward śūnyatā brings with 
it the realization that our own suchness and the suchness of tech-
nology are in fact no different. Both our biological parts and tech-
nological parts stand in the field of emptiness as the same. They 
may take on different instantiations of Form inside this field of 
emptiness, but nonetheless are the same qua emptiness. In this 
way, Nishitani's perspective of śūnyatā allows us to open new 
avenues for exploration of the nature of human existence in light 
of technological progress, contributing back to the discussion of 
technology from the standpoint of emptiness. 
 In this larger embedding space in which Nishitani's and 
Clark's views lie, we may turn toward other issues that Nishitani 
raises. He cites the progress of human morality as falling behind 
technological progress. This has largely been the case in the cur-
rent digital age of machine learning, though significant work is 
being done to this end.32, 33, 34 Significant thought has recently 
been put into how technological progress impacts employment35, 
36, 37 and possible solutions to feared widespread automation. The 
positive potential of technology can also be seen in various ways 
that technology has highlighted and elevated human creativity.38, 
39, 40 Looking at technology as an extension of human life rather 
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than as distinct from our selves becomes more important as tools 
continue to get smarter and integrate further into our lives. There 
is a distinct difference between a hammer and the aforementioned 
brain implant in the level of integration into human life. 
Nishitani's viewpoint can be read as pointing toward this by real-
izing that technology, in emptiness, is no different from self. 
Clark's account points directly toward this notion by driving tech-
nology and humanity together. 
 Most important to Nishitani's conception of humanity, as 
we saw, was the breaking through of nihility by recognizing Bud-
dhist emptiness. Clark's conception of technology helps facilitate 
a turn toward śūnyatā by providing an explanatory device in illus-
trating the Buddhist notion of no-self. The Buddhist idea is that 
ultimately I have no self; there is only this emptiness. Insofar as I 
can be identified, it is only because I instantiate what are called 
the five aggregates. These are (1) material form (physical embod-
iment), (2) sensation (physical and emotional feeling), (3) percep-
tion, (4) “mental formations” (attitudes and dispositions), and (5) 
consciousness.41 If we take away the five aggregates, there is no 
self to be found. Clark's notion of cyborgianism offers a real-
world flexibility of self that requires only a small step to imagine 
what there is when the parts all go away: śūnyatā. 
 We can now imagine, without much difficulty, the idea of 
adding physical parts to ourselves and imagine these parts as be-
ing constituents of ourselves. It is not a large step, then, to imag-
ine what happens when we begin taking away parts. As we can 
imagine adding a mechanical arm to Stelarc, we can imagine tak-
ing away a biological arm. We may then remove the other arm, 
both legs, and consciousness. What is left is this Buddhist empti-
ness. There is no ‘Stelarc’ to be found outside the conglomeration 
of parts, both biological and technological. This sidesteps the 
need to use technology as a tool in driving toward nihility by 
questioning the notion that we are stable selves head on. We thus 
move directly from self to śūnyatā and bypass the need to force a 
viewpoint of technology leading to nihilism from which we must 
escape through emptiness. 
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